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Abstract 
This study will inspect the propaganda of the German Fatherland Party found in 
rightist newspapers published in Berlin, the capital of the German Empire. This 
propaganda explained the goals of the party, which included a desire to win a Siegfrieden 
(Victory Peace), to increase the Siegeswillen (Will for Victory) within the German 
population, to annex vast territory in the East and West, and to create a unified block of 
citizens within Germany by reviving the ancient myth of Deutschtum or an essential 
"Germanness." In response to this new nationalistic party, the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (S P D) organized its own anti-Fatherland Party propaganda, which 
successfully prevented the leftist working class from joining the Fatherland Party. This 
study is important because it illustrates the significance of public opinion and explains 
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The German Fatherland Party (Vaterlandspartei) was an extremely conservative, 
anti-parliamentary political party founded in September 1917, at the start of the fourth 
year of the First World War. This party is extremely important to German history 
because it was the first mass party of the Right. Rightist parties, prior to the formation of 
the Fatherland Party, were small, exclusive bastions of the landed elite and powerful 
industrialists more given to small debates than mobilizing the masses. In contrast, the 
Fatherland Party attempted to create a more populist right-wing political organization, 
which would bring together all aspects of German society. The hidden legacy of this 
new, more radical conservative party is staggering: it dominated the political culture in 
Germany for over a year and its ideas and beliefs have haunted Germany ever since. 
Nationalist activists Wolfgang Kapp and Admiral Al fred von Tirpitz led the party 
with the financial support of many wealthy businessmen and industrialists such as Al fred 
Hugenberg and Carl Siemens; other important members included Prussian landowners, 
Protestant ministers, and university professors. 1 Kapp and Tirpitz founded the Fatherland 
Party in 1917 to bolster patriotism and the will for victory within Germany and to fight 
the growing peace movements in the Reichstag, which had recently passed a Peace 
Resolution. During the course of the next year, the Fatherland Party, which claimed that 
it recruited over one million members (making it on paper the largest party in German 
1David Welch, Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918: The Sins of Omission (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 200. 
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politics), created a powerful propaganda machine aimed at manipulating public opinion 
in order to stop the peace movements within Germany and to promote wide annexationist 
goals in Eastern and Wes tern Europe. The historian Friedrich Meinecke, a contemporary 
and critic of the Fatherland Party, wrote in 1946 that the "Pan- Germans and the 
Fatherland party are an exact prelude to Hitler's rise to power. "2 Although Meinecke did 
not offer further explanation, this statement prompted the debate, which continues ever 
since, on whether the Fatherland Party was a pre-fascist organization and a precursor to 
Nazism, or instead a holdover of an earlier politics of notables. 
Yet, in spite of these stakes, the historiography of the German Fatherland Party is 
sparse, including only two monographs, one unpublished dissertation, a few articles, and 
casual mentions within wider ranging histories.3 Much of the historiography revolves 
around the key question of whether the Fatherland Party was a precursor to the Nazis. In 
Die Erben Bismarcks, published in 1970, German scholar Dirk Stegmann concluded that 
the Fatherland Party was pre- or proto-fascist because of the later Nazi connections of 
one of its members, Anton Drexler.4 Drexler, a locksmith working at the Munich railway 
yards, joined the Fatherland Party shortly after its conception, but quickly grew 
disillusioned with what he saw as its lack of genuine interest in the plight of the working 
class. However, be fore Drexler officially left the party, he made contact with Wilhelm 
2Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, translated by 
Sidney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 30. 
3George Etue, "The German Fatherland Party, 1917-1918" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at 
Berkeley, 1959); Heinz Hagenliicke, Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. Die nationale Rechte am Ende des 
Kaiserreiches (Dtisseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1997); Jay Hatheway, "The Pre-1920 Origins of the National 
Socialist German Workers' Party," Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 3 (July, 1994): 443-462; Hans 
Peter Mtiller, "Die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei in Wtirttemberg 1917/18 und ihr Erbe: Besorgte Patrioten 
oder rechte ldeologen?," Zeitschriftfur Wurttembergische Landesgeschichte 59 (2000):217-245; Karl 
Wortmann, Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlands-Partei, 1917-1918 (Halle, 1926). 
4Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks. Parteien und Verbiinde in der Spiitphase des 
Wilhelminischen Deutschlands Sammlungspolitik, 1897-1918 (Berlin: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1970). 
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Wahl, who was a member of the German Fatherland Party and founder of the Free 
Committee for a German Workers' Peace. This war-aims committee, headquartered in 
Bremen, actively recruited workers by printing "its pamphlets at government cost" and 
passing "them out in factories."5 Early in 1918, Wahl contacted Drexler, urging him to 
open a Munich branch of the Free Committee for a German Workers' Peace. In March 
1918, Drexler agreed. After the war, Drexler's branch of the Free Committee for a 
German Workers' Peace in Munich became the basis for the German Worker's Party 
(later renamed the NSDAP at Hitler's urging), creating a direct link, or so Stegmann 
argued, from the Fatherland Party to the National Socialists. 
In 1997, Heinz Hagenliicke, another German scholar, published Deutsche 
Vaterlandspartei, the most recent monograph on the subject.6 Hagenliicke argued that 
the Fatherland Party was in fact not proto-fascist because "the party was explicitly 
founded as a party and not a movement, members reflected the typical picture of high 
Wilhelmine society in contrast to the lower class organizations of the Weimar Republic, 
which sociologically reached the lower-middle class, soldiers, and the youth."7 In 
addition, the Fatherland Party "was lacking the Fuhrerprinzip, which had a tremendous 
impact on the NSDAP," and the party's abstention from the use of violence was not 
representative of the later record of the Nazi regime.8 However not all historians agree 
with Hagenliicke's assessment, such as Hans Peter Mtiller, who argued that "the 
prehistory of the Nazi movement did not begin in 1920," but "when the Pan-German 
5Jeffrey Verhey, Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 184. 




ideology in the Fatherland Party found a mass base and a popular following" during the 
last year of the Great War.9 
In addition, American scholars such as Raffael Scheck, Jeffrey Verhey, and David 
Welch have done research on the Fatherland Party. Welch, in Germany, Propaganda and 
Total War 1914-1918, wrote that the Fatherland Party was reactionary in nature, meaning 
that it was "determined to maintain the status quo at home . . .  while waging an aggressive 
agitation campaign, for a 'peace with victorf and large-scale annexations in the East and 
the West."10 Welch agreed with Hagenli.icke that the Fatherland Party was not a 
precursor for the Nazi Party. In The Spirit of 1914, Verhey likewise argued that the 
Fatherland Party was not a precursor to Nazism because it failed to achieve its stated aim 
of reaching the working class, although this criterion is problematic since scholars still 
debate how much success the Nazis themselves in fact achieved in reaching the working 
class. Nevertheless, Verhey did conclude that the party "was a pregnant failure," because 
members of the party, such as Anton Drexler, went on to form more radical conservative 
parties that were capable of gaining mass support. 11 Scheck, in Alfred von Tirpitz and 
German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930, agreed with recent scholars of the Fatherland 
Party that the party was not proto-fascist. However, he disagreed with Hagenli.icke's 
belief that Kapp was the prime mover of the party; he assigned this role to Tirpitz.12 
Regardless of who actually controlled the direction of the Fatherland Party, this 
new party indisputably aspired to influence public opinion in a more populist way by 
9Hans Peter Mtiller, "Die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei in Wtirttemberg 1917/18," 245. 
10 Welch, Sins of Omission, 30. 
11Verhey, Spirit of 1914, 184. 
12Raffael Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930 (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1998). 
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feeding its propaganda into the sympathetic, rightist press. These politically affiliated 
newspapers performed the extremely important function of attempting to direct public 
opinion in early twentieth-century Europe, as the population at large became more 
politically aware and active. According to Peter Fritzsche in Germans into Nazis, the 
experience of the First World War fundamentally changed the German public, making it 
more politically active and willing "to fashion its [ own] national and economic 
destiny." 1 3  In essence, by 1918, "Germany's political future had now become the people, 
the great curbside republic of soldiers, workers, and consumers."14 Astute politicians and 
other forward-looking leaders of Germany recognized this new political entity and 
attempted to control it using propaganda. Propaganda, according to French sociologist 
Jacques Ellul, is "a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring 
about active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, 
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an 
organization." 15 This definition described perfectly the techniques of the Fatherland 
Party, because the organization attempted to guide the actions of a "mass of individuals," 
the German population at large. 
The propaganda of the German Fatherland Party advocated holding out for a 
Siegfrieden (Victory Peace), increasing the Siegeswillen (Will for Victory) within the 
German population, and creating a unified block of citizens within Germany by reviving 
the idea of Burgfrieden and stressing the empowering myth of Deutschtum or an essential 
"Germanness." In order to create a unified block, the leaders of the Fatherland Party 
13Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 82. 
14Ibid., 82. 
15Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, translated by Konrad Kellen 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 61. 
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attempted to gain recognition among the working classes. However, these efforts were 
handicapped as many socialist and leftist newspapers refused to print the party's 
announcements and advertisements. Nevertheless, this situation did not mean the 
Fatherland Party could not succeed in reaching portions of the working class. According 
to Alex Hall, in Scandal, Sensation, and Social Democracy, unemployed workers did in 
fact read non-socialist papers, in particular to find job advertisements, since employers 
were unwilling to place employment announcements in socialist publications, thus 
making them susceptible to the Fatherland Party's propaganda. 16 In addition, it needs to 
be remembered that not all workers in Germany were socialist or even sympathetic to the 
socialist cause. For instance, in the early twentieth century, there were approximately 
twelve million workers in Germany and during the pivotal Reichstag elections of 1912, 
the SPD polled only a little over four million votes. This meant that the socialists, at best, 
only received one third of the working-class vote. 17 Thus, the working classes, whether 
sympathetic to the socialist cause or not, encountered conservative newspapers, even if 
they did so with skepticism. 
Based on the evidence above, there was definitely an opportunity for a right-wing 
party to gain influence among the working classes, although the Fatherland Party did not. 
However, this does not mean that the party was a complete failure. In fact, if one 
16Alex Hall, Scandal, Sensation and Social Democracy: The SPD Press and Wilhelmine Germany 
1890-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 36. Hall explicitly deals with the question of 
organized workers and their reading habits. 
17See W. L. Guttsman, The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933: From Ghetto to 
Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), especially chapter three; Susanne Miller and 
Heinrich Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present, translated by J. A. 
Underwood (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 294; Mary Nolan, Social Democracy and Society: 
Working-Class Radicalism in Dusseldorf, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
especially chapters eleven and twelve. 
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considers that the Fatherland Party's real goal was to rally all aspects of the middle-class 
behind the war effort, by creating the image of a desperate, hungry, and revolutionary 
working class that would emerge in Germany if the war ended in failure, the party did 
achieve some success. 18 
As the Fatherland Party agitated against the policies of the Reichstag Majority 
(consisting of the SPD, the Progressive Party, and the Catholic Center Party), the party 
was inevitably going to make many political enemies. However, none was more 
vociferous than the SPD, which was initially deeply troubled by the Fatherland Party's 
aim of recruiting a mass following, along with its attempt to destroy the Peace Resolution 
of July 1917 and break up the Reichstag majority. Moreover, once the leaders of the SPD 
realized that the threat of the Fatherland Party siphoning off support from the working 
class was minimal, a shift occurred: they began to use the image of the Fatherland Party, 
produced in their media, as an enemy-image to unify the fragmented socialist movement. 
These reasons motivated the Social Democrats to organize their own anti-Fatherland 
Party propaganda that in part successfully prevented the leftist working class from joining 
this new nationalistic party and even inspired a popular movement against the Fatherland 
Party. 
In order to comprehend this conflict fully, one must understand the political 
milieu from which the German Fatherland Party and its counter-movement emerged. 
Although many of the conflicts between the right and left had their origins prior to 1914, 
18This idea came out a discussion with Dr. Denise Phillips, assistant professor of German history 
at the University of Tennessee, as we were discussing the Fatherland Party's lack of insight into the needs 
of the working class. We came to a tentative conclusion that the party may have been really trying to create 
an image of a resentful and revolutionary working classes to unite the middle-class ( out of fear) behind the 
goals of the Fatherland Party. 
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a new political atmosphere coalesced with the declaration of war on 1 August 1914, as 
the Kaiser called for a domestic peace (Burgfrieden) and the troops marched off to 
Flanders in hopes of a quick victory. As reality set in and hopes for a quick victory 




The War Begins: Burgfrieden and German War Aims 
In Au gus t 1914 crowds of ci tizens cheered Ge rmany's en try in to the war agains t 
the Allied powers . 19 Crowds formed in all the grea t ci ties of Germany. Par ticipan ts 
ga thered in hopes for a glorious war; they hoped to c rush their enemies by Chris tmas. 
Many Ge rmans viewed the war as a cul tural s truggle agains t "the English shopkeeper 
men tali ty, Gallic shallowness, and Slavic barbarism " in s tark con tras t to the glories of 
German Kultur. 20 On 1 Augus t, Kaiser Wilhelm II pr oclaimed from the balcony of the 
Royal Palace tha t  "when i t  comes to war, all pa rties cease and we are all bro thers. This 
or tha t  par ty has a ttacked me in peace time, bu t I forgive them now whole-hear tedly."21 
Then, three days la ter, shor tly after Grea t Bri tain declared war on Germany for viola ting 
Belgium neu trali ty, the Kaiser pronounced from the throne in the Whi te Hall of the Royal 
Palace in full mili tary uniform tha t  "I know no more par ties, I only know Germans." 
These two speeches ushered in the Burgfrieden ( Peace of the Cas tle), when all the 
fac tions of German socie ty (in theory) uni ted to defea t their common enemies. 
Al though recen t scholars have ques tioned the alleged universal unanimi ty of the 
'spiri t of 1914' and the early success of the Burgfrieden, there was never theless 
subs tan tial suppor t for the war in the popula tion and among the poli tical par ties of 
19This celebration was by no means universal within the German population, but the outbreak of 
the war did create wide enthusiasm at the beginning of the war. 
�ans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, translated by Kim Traynor (New York: 
Berg Publishers, 1985), 213-214. For a detailed explanation of the differences between German Kultur and 
Western Civilization, see Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic 
Investigations, translated by Edmund Jephcott (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1982). 
21 Ralph Lutz, ed. and trans., Fall of the German Empire, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1932), 4. 
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Imperial Germany.22 For instance, the "spirit of 1914" even swept up the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), as the party disregarded its established position as a 
revolutionary opposition party and abandoned its traditional anti-military stance. The 
SPD believed it was supporting a defensive war and hoped to end Russian despotism. To 
complete the Burgfrieden, the Progressives, the Catholic Center, and the Conservatives 
also rallied behind the Kaiser and the Reich. 
This peace did not last. General von Moltke's failure to execute adequately the 
Schlieffen Plan (if it was indeed even possible to do so) ended the expectation of a quick 
victory over France. The failure to secure a quick victory caused fractures in the 
Burgfrieden, as the emerging debate over war aims, which began in earnest after the 
government lifted the ban on discussing war aims in 1916, destroyed the illusion that the 
conflict was defensive in nature. Fritz Fischer argued that the Burgfrieden succeeded 
because all parties in Germany agreed on the need to gain territorial and economic 
advantages from the war. 23 This view has come under fire by recent historians, who 
claim that there was in fact a serious divide in opinion over the conduct of the war.24 One 
scholar claimed the debate over war aims "polarized society into two camps: those 
supporting a war of self defence [sic] and those demanding total victory with 
annexations. "25 This polarization led to the collapse of the domestic peace and a 
22For the most recent scholarship on the issue of the August madness and the domestic peace, see 
Verhey, The Spirit of 1914. 
23 Fritz Fischer, Germany 's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton and Company, Inc., 
1 967). 
24For an excellent summary of Germany's war aims, see Holger Herwig, "Tunes of Glory at the 
Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918," 
German Studies Review 6, no. 3 (1983): 475-494. For a more recent view on this argument, see Welch, � 
Sins of Omission, Chapter 3. 
25Welch, Sins of Omission, 65. 
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reene rgi zed de si re fo r  internal political re fo rm by the lefti st pa rtie s in the Reich stag. 
Howeve r, be fo re the con frontation between the se two oppo sing side s reached it s clima x, 
the Right and Left both e xpe rienced split s  in thei r re spective g ro uping s. 
The radical left wing of the S P D, led by Ka rl Liebknecht and Ro sa Luxemb urg, 
o fficially st ruck a blow at the al ready c rumbling Burgfrieden by refu sing to vote fo r  the 
fifth wa r bill in Decembe r 1915, beca use they no longe r believed the government' s claim 
of waging a defen sive wa r. Thi s led to the S P D' s  e jection of thei r in subo rdinate 
membe rs in Ma rch 1916. Thi s g ro up ultimately fo rmed the Independent Social 
Democ ratic Pa rty ( US P D) in Ap ril 1917. Roge r Chicke ring stated, "thi s momento us 
event signaled the death of wo rk ing-cla ss solida rity in Ge rmany," a s  both pa rtie s 
"competed fo r  the loyaltie s of Ge rman wo rke rs." 26 Altho ugh thi s statement ha s some 
t ruth, the majo rity of the sociali st wo rke rs, while po ssibly suppo rting the highly c ritical 
and vehement c ritici sm of the government e spo used by the US P D  leade rship, still mo stly 
tho ught of them selve s a s  membe rs of the majo rity S P D  and voted acco rdingly. 
At the same time a s  the sociali st movement wa s splinte ring, the con se rvative s 
we re e xpe riencing a schi sm in thei r own rank s. The rad ical -nationali st wing of the 
con se rvative s con si sted of membe rs from the national p re ssure g ro up s  of p revio us 
vintage, mo st notably the Pan -Ge rman Leag ue, the Navy Leag ue, the Ag ra rian Leag ue, 
and the Defen se Leag ue. Thi s gro up of con se rvative s wa s, fo r  the mo st pa rt, pop uli st 
(they wanted to c reate a g ra ss- root s movement not nece ssarily fo r  in stit utional, elite 
con se rvative s), and highly c ritical of the Impe rial government fo r  it s pe rceived pa ssivity. 
�oger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1 998), 159. 
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These radicals believed the government should not work with the socialists, nor support 
any peace proposal that did not advocate substantial annexations. One radical nationalist, 
Wolfgang Kapp, director general of the East Prussian Land Bank, circulated a 
memorandum, in May 1916, highly critical of the Imperial government, especially the 
Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. 
Kapp sent out his memorandum to influential members of the government. It was 
entitled "The National Groups and the Imperial Chancellor," and blamed Bethmann 
Hollweg for the political discontent of the German population, for ending unrestricted 
submarine warfare, for vacillating on war aims, and for his stance on internal reforms. 
Kapp claimed that "the most faithful-minded groups of our people and specifically those 
who possess the most political instinct" were discouraged, not because of "the army, the 
navy, or the victorious prosecution of the war," but due to the political ineptitude of the 
chancellor.27 Kapp ridiculed Bethmann's call for unity, saying that unity now meant to 
"be silent, keep quiet, believe and hope everything, but lock your worries in this greatest, 
most beautiful, and darkest hour in Germany history in your breast."28 Kapp compared 
this statement to an older precedent: when the military governor of Berlin, Count von der 
Schulenberg, told his subjects (after Napoleon's capture of the city), "'quiet is the 
citizen's first duty,"' which effectively ended the dream of a popular uprising against the 
French in 1806.29 Moreover, Kapp argued that ending the U-Boot war in fact lengthened 
the overall conflict and allowed America to dictate German war strategy. Another reason 
for Kapp's discontent was the issue of war aims. He desired to annex Belgium and the 




Baltic provinces "for the safeguarding of the future of our nation."30 However, Kapp 
claimed that Bethmann had forsaken Belgium already to British domination and wanted 
to fight for the independence of Poles and other non-Russians under the ''Tsarist yoke", 
to which Kapp replied, "We do not fight for the Poles or for other foreigners."31  
On the issue of political reform, Kapp rejected any constitutional reform of 
Prussian' s  three-class suffrage laws, but instead claimed that "the basis of a truly political 
freedom is the economic independence and the economic self-determination of the 
individual" and warned not to let internal political disagreements destroy progress in this 
direction.32 Kapp concluded his letter with the following warning: "The Fatherland is in 
danger! Therefore it is the right and duty of every German to break this oppressive 
silence before it is too late."33 This incendiary note led Bethmann Hollweg to call Kapp 
the "pirate of public opinion" and eventually produced Kapp's  firing as the director of the 
East Prussian Land Bank.34 More importantly, this memorandum caused two further 
developments of far more importance to the history of Imperial Germany. On the one 
hand, attacks of this sort prompted the increasing dependence of the government on non­
conservative members of the Reichstag. On the other, it spurred the movement of the far 
right to make its voice heard, culminating in the founding of the German Fatherland Party 
in September 1917 .  
By publicly calling for the removal of the chancellor and demanding that people 





34"Behordliche Werbung fiir die Vaterlandspartei," Vorwiirts (Berlin), 24 Sept. 1917. 
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the emperor and helped to undermine the idea that nationalism and the crown were 
intertwined. In effect, Kapp helped create the milieu in which rightist opposition could 
flourish. Ironically, it also created the environment for his enemies to flourish, as the 
government had to rely on its traditional antagonists, the center and leftist parties, for 
support. 
Flexing their muscles, the traditional opposition parties (the SPD, Center, and 
Progressive parties) in the Reichstag began to assert themselves by demanding political 
reform and an end to the war, giving voice to popular desires (a new role they saw as 
implicit in the Burgfrieden). Specifically, the leaders of the Reichstag advocated that the 
Imperial government at last abolish the unrepresentative wealth-based three-class voting 
system of the Prussian Landtag, which dated back to 1850 and effectively kept power in 
the hands of the traditional elite (while the national Reichstag was elected by universal 
manhood suffrage). The Kaiser, under pressure from a disgruntled population, published 
his Easter Message on 8 April 1917 that promised to reform the Prussian suffrage system, 
albeit after the successful completion of the war. The Kaiser 's  announcement failed to 
satisfy the left and almost completely alienated the extreme right. 
Furious over Bethmann Hollweg's decision not to consult the German Military 
High Command (OHL) about the Easter Message, Ludendorff and Hindenburg (who 
ascended to the OHL in August 1916) began to pressure the Kaiser to replace the current 
Chancellor, who served at his pleasure. The OHL claimed that Bethmann had "not 
succeeded in maintaining solidarity and enthusiasm for the war in the nation" and was 
14 
allowing t he Left to direct domestic po licy.35 By Ju ly 1917 t he Reic hst ag de leg ates, t he 
OHL, t he r adic al rig ht ,  and m any he avy industri alists were all asking for t he he ad of 
Bet hm ann Ho llweg, alt houg h it w as not unti l Hindenburg and Ludendorff t hre atened to 
resign on 12 June 1917 t hat t he K aiser m ade Georg Mic hae lis t he new c hance llor. 
Mic hae lis w as a litt le known Prussi an ci vi l  ser vant, w ho bec ame a puppet of t he OHL. 
T he new ly formed Reic hst ag m ajority, consisting of t he S P D, t he C at ho lic Center 
P arty, and t he P rogressi ve Peop le's P arty, prompt ly voted on t he Pe ace Reso lution of 19 
Ju ly 1917, cre ating e ven more angst in t he OHL. T his p lan, according to its proponents, 
stipu lated a pe ace in w hic h no country wou ld be forced to p ay rep ar ations and no 
annex ations wou ld be m ade. Howe ver, t he reso lution "w as de liber ate ly couc hed in vague 
terms " t hat allowed t he Germ an go vernment to pursue its "precise w ar aims," w hic h t he 
later Tre aty of Brest- Lito vsk in 1918 exemp lified per fect ly.36 E ven t houg h t he pe ace 
reso lution lacked definiti ve terms and in pr actice (as it turned out) allowed Germ an 
o ffici als to ac hie ve almost any pe ace, it g alvanized t he Germ an rig ht out of its p assi vity, 
as it beg an a c amp aign to counter t he pe ace and reform mo vements inside of Germ any. 
In late Ju ly 1917, on t he hee ls of t he p assing of t he Pe ace Reso lution, Ludendorf f 
beg an his prop ag and a "c amp aign to up lift army mor ale " and win o ver pub lic opinion on 
t he home front. According to Ludendor ff, t he two were intertwined. 37 T his progr am w as 
or ig in ally c alled 'en lig htenment ser vice' (Aujklarungsdienst), but w as c hanged to 
'p atr iotic inst ruction' (Vaterliindischer Unterricht) in Septem ber 1917. According to 
D avid We lc h, Ludendorf f' s progr am stressed four ide as :  
35Fischer. Germany 's Aims in the First World War. 394. 
36welch. Sins of Omission. 194. 
37JUrgen Forster. "Ludendorff and Hitler in Perspective: The Battle for the German Soldier·s 
Mind. 1917- 1944 ... War in History 10. no. 3 (2003): 321-334. 
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1) The Causes of the War. The economic development of Germany, its 
importance and consequences of a lost war, particularly from the point of view of 
the working class. 
(2) Confidence in Final Victory. The war was turning decisively in Germany's 
favor and devotion to duty and manly pride are to be encouraged. 
(3) The Necessity and Importance of Leadership (the army, the Government, civil 
administration, industry and commerce). Hence the necessity for authority and it 
[sic] corollary, obedience. There must be unflinching confidence in the Emperor and 
the princes of the federal states, as well as military leaders. 
(4) The Enemy, who is placing all his hopes on our economic and political 
collapse must be convinced that we cannot be beaten in the field. 38 
As will be shown later, Ludendorff's propaganda ideas were remarkably similar to the 
aims of German Fatherland Party, a symmetry which many historians have noticed. 
Gerald D. Feldman, in Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918, 
claimed outright that the OHL created the Fatherland Party and more specifically, that it 
was "the brainstorm of the Chief of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolai."39 
Feldman argued that Ludendorff encouraged his associates on the right to create a mass 
party to increase morale on the home front, acting as a supplement to his "patriotic 
instruction" in the army. Feldman's view of Ludendorff's guiding hand in the formation 
of the Fatherland Party did not win many converts among subsequent historians. Many 
historians see a similarity between Ludendorff's "patriotic instruction" and the goals of 
the Fatherland Party, but they do not believe Ludendorff was directly involved in creating 
the party. 
For instance, Martin Kitchen, in Silent Dictatorship, argued that Ludendorff and 
Hindenburg matched the Marxist definition of a Bonapartist regime (a form of 
dictatorship created when the middle-class acquiesces in ceding its political power to 
38Welch, Sins of Omission, 207-208. 
39Gerald Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germnay, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966), 429. 
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protect its material wealth from the working class), which was backed politically by the 
Fatherland Party.40 More specifically, the Fatherland Party "became the organized mass 
political support for the policies of the OIIl.., thus formalizing the pseudo-democratic 
dimension of the bonapartism of the OIIl..."41 In addition, Kitchen explained that the 
Fatherland Party used the propaganda apparatus of the OIIl.. to further its own aims, not 
the other way around, as claimed by Feldman. Gatzke, in Germany 's Drive to the West, 
and Kocka, in Facing Total War, recognized the similarity between the propagandist 
aims of both organizations but neither claimed there was an official connection between 
the two.42 
In spite of these debates, the key point is not whether there was an official 
connection between the Fatherland Party and the OIIl.., but that they were similar in spirit 
and both tried to direct and influence public opinion in Germany through their 
propaganda. The most significant aspect of the Fatherland Party, not previously explored 
in detail, is the effect its propaganda had on public opinion within the German 
population. Since the Fatherland Party was critical of the government, it could no longer 
claim validity from traditional rightist sources, such as the Kaiser and his government, 
and had to gain popular acceptance to have any legitimacy in German politics. In this 
study, the focus is on the Fatherland Party's propaganda, in order to understand how it 
tried to obtain this legitimacy. The Fatherland party attempted to create an image of itself 
"°Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1976). 
41Ibid., 139. 
42Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West: A Study of Germany's Western War Aims 
During the First World War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 216; Jtirgen Kocka, Facing Total 
War: German Society, 1914-1918, translated by Barbara Weinberger (Leamington Spa, Warwickshire: 
Berg Publishers, 1984 ), 13 1. 
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as an organization for every German; it did not want to be viewed as the racist, anti­
Semitic, conservative, or an anti-worker organization that others (then and now) have 
explained it to be. This issue of self-depiction is important because the party is usually 
portrayed as an extension of the national pressure groups. In reality, the party presented 
itself very differently.43 
43By this I do not mean that the party's espoused aims were all its true goals, only that historians 
need to look at how the party wanted to be seen, not only how its enemies described it, because only then 
can we come closer to understanding it and how the Fatherland Party affected public opinion in the German 
population. 
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Chapter III 
"The Undersigned Men of East Prussia": The Founding of the German Fatherland 
Party 
Admiral Al fred v on Tirpit z and W olfgang Kapp founded the German Fatherland 
Party on 2 September 1917 on the 47 th anniversary of Sedan Day, a h oliday th .at 
c ommem orated the German vic tory ove r  France in 187 0. The event t ook place in the 
Y orck r oom of the city hall in K onigsberg ( Y orck was a fam ous "patri otic rebel" wh o in 
1812 had called fo r  Prussians t o  overthr ow Nap ol eonic rule in Prussia) .44 This date and 
l ocati on were ch osen by the leaders of the Fathe rland Pa rty t o  ev oke the st rongest sense 
of patri otism and nati onalism in the German p opulace by linking the party t o  a Prussian ­
German traditi on of patri otic rev olt and m obili zati on . 
Admi ral v on Ti rpi tz came from the Prussian uppe r-middle class, alth ough he was 
enn obled in 1900 at the age of fifty- one by the Kaiser "as a mark of fav or," and occupied 
the p ositi on of Secretary of State for the Navy from 1897- 1916.45 Identi fied with the new 
Weltpolitik, he initiated Germany's naval build-up and m ode rni zati on, which fueled the 
naval c om petiti on between Great Britain and Germany. Ti rpit z resigned his p ost in 1916 
in pr otest at the Imperial G ove rnment's decisi on t o  st op unrestricted submarine warfare. 
During his year and a half as Chairman of the Fatherland Party, he ti relessly pre formed 
his duties, but afte r the war and the diss oluti on of the p arty in Decembe r 1918, Ti rpit z 
44Both Jeffery Verhey and Hans-Ulrich Wehler claim that the Fatherland Party was actually 
founded on 3 September, but regardless of the actual date of its founding, the party clearly wanted the 
German population to believe that it was founded on the symbolically potent Sedan Day. 
45Robert Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: 
Random House, 1 991 ), 166. 
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spent the next years formulating plans to overthrow the Weimar Republic. However, 
none of his plans reached fruition and in 1924 Tirpitz accepted a seat in the Reichstag as 
a delegate of the German National People's Party (DNVP), successor to the conservative 
party. He led the party until his death on 6 March 1930. 
Wolfgang Kapp was born on 24 July 1858 in New York City; his father had fled 
to America after the failed German revolution of 1848. In 1870, Kapp moved to 
Germany to finish primary school and later to attend college. After completion of his 
baccalaureate, he decided to pursue his law degree, which he earned in 1882 from the 
university in Celle. After completing his law exam, Kapp rose quickly through the 
bureaucratic system of Imperial Germany, becoming Prussian Agriculture Minister in 
1900 and director general of the East Prussian Land Bank in 1906. As co-leader of the 
Fatherland Party, he was instrumental in the policies of the party and later he became 
notorious for his failed attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic in 1920. 
Both Tirpitz and Kapp were associated with many middle-class rightist groups 
and in particular, the Pan-Germans (although neither were members of the Pan-German 
League). The Pan-Germans, founded in 1893, were a group of super-nationalist, volkisch 
(denoting a special commitment to the German people and their connection to the 
German lands, usually used for racist organizations believing the German race to be 
superior), imperialist, and radical activists. Although a small group, numbering around 
22,000 on the eve of the First World War, it had (ironically, since it was opposed to the 
government) connections and influence out of proportion to its size.46 
46 Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German 
League, 1886-1914 (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 2. 
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After the disappointing summer of 19 17, Kapp "had the fantastic idea to stimulate 
a mass movement that would not only rally the Germans behind the war effort but 'raise 
Tirpitz on the shield' and show that the 'people' called for him."47 Tirpitz, urged on by 
Kapp and other prominent rightists, decided to lead this new movement. Tirpitz was a 
great choice for the new leader because of his earlier experience with populist 
propaganda techniques that he acquired while trying to pass his naval bills, which would 
become useful during his tenure as First Chairman of the Fatherland Party. Tirpitz 
helped make the navy a popular idea in the early 1900 's  by sponsoring tours of new ships 
for the public, pressuring schools to explain the importance of a strong German navy, and 
hiring authors to write "novels and pamphlets."48 This feat was even more impressive 
because all the money for Tirpitz' s propaganda campaign for his naval bills came from 
private donors. After much deliberation, the leaders finally settled on naming the new 
party the German Fatherland Party, after considering other possible names including the 
"Hindenburg Party" or "Bismarck Party."49 However, both of these names "would have 
been considered a snub of the Kaiser" and were rejected. The party' s  first manifesto, 
which was published in many rightist newspapers of Germany (it appeared in the 
Berliner Neueste Nachrichten three times, twice on 10 September and once on 12  
September), illustrated how the leaders of  the new party wanted to portray themselves to 
the German public. 50 
47Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz, 66. 
48Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, Inc., 1919), 
146. 
49Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis, 65. 
SOorhis manifesto was published in many newspapers in Berlin, but has been translated from the 
German newspaper, Norddeutsche Allgemeine 'Zeitung, by Ralph Lutz in Fall of the German Empire, 368-
370. 
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The manifesto o f  the Fatherland Par ty opened with the statement: "Large se ctions 
o f  the German publi c are not in agreement with the attitude o f  the present Rei chstag 
ma jority regarding the most vital questions o f  the Fatherland." 51 The Fatherland Par ty 
claimed that the Rei chstag ma jority did not represent the wishes o f  the people on the 
issues o f  national unity, pea ce resolutions, and the state o f  the war . 
The manifesto claimed that the German publi c viewed "the endeavor to pla ce 
con fli ct on constitutional questions in the foreground as a danger to the Fatherland and an 
advantage to the enemy." 52 Although the leaders o f  the Fatherland P arty portrayed 
sympat heti cally the German people 's desire for pea ce, the manifesto des cribed the 
current pea ce proposals as "nervous and weak," whi ch "only postpone pea ce" and made 
Germany appear in conse quential to its enemies.53 In even more bitter terms, the par ty 
program denoun ced the Rei chstag pea ce resolution as a prelude to a "starvation pea ce" 
and pleaded with patrioti c Germans, "I f we willingly bear through distress and 
deprivation, the German people will gain a Hindenburg pea ce ." 54 Although the 
Hindenburg pea ce was not de fined clearly (but it would be later in the party's 
propaganda ), the mani festo did reassure Germans that it "wi ll ade quate ly repay the pri ce 
o f  vi ctory, terrible sa crifi ce, and exertion." 55 
In an attempt to re-create the alleged Spirit o f  1914, the manifesto urged the 
German people to be "united in the will to vi ctory" and in the spirit o f  Burgfrieden aimed 
"at welding together the whole energy o f  the Fatherland without distin ction o f  par ty 








politi cs," w ork ing "hand in hand for the confirmati on of the will t o  con quer and t o  
over come di fficulties. "56 This new party de pi cted itself as the only h ope for the German 
pe ople, pr om ising t o  res cue Germany fr om the ma chinati ons of the Rei chstag ma jor ity 
and the S P D  in pa rti cular. The last w ords are par ti cul arly poignant: 
T o  all wh o subs cr ibe t o  these views we a ppeal t o  join the German Fatherland Party. Anyone wishing t o  hel p is wel come. The aims of the par ty must be realized at on ce. N ot a m oment is t o  be l ost. Germany's salvati on, h on or, and future is at stake !57 
The plat form als o contained cer tain un cons ci ous ambiguities and pe rplexing 
statements. F or exam ple, the writers den oun ced the British for think ing of the First 
W orld Wa r as a "matter of business," but they later a ppealed t o  the material interests of 
the German pe ople by stating that the "starvati on pea ce "  im peded "our positi on in the 
w orld and a ccom panying int olerable burdens w ould destr oy our com mer cial situati on and 
all the pr os pe cts of our w orking classes."58 M ore over, the founders of the par ty de clared 
that they re presented all Germans, but pla ced em phasis on their own Prussian her itage by 
writing that "the undersigned men of East Prussia ... have founded the German Fatherland 
Party" and continu ously refe rred only t o  the Prussian greatness of Germany.59 F or 
instan ce, they did n ot menti on the her itage of Charlemagne or any other great H oly 
Roman Em per or, bu t only wr ote a b ou t  Germany's re cen t Pruss ian and n on-Ca th ol ic 
traditi on, "calling to mind wi th grati tude our first bel oved Emper or of undying mem ory 
and his i ron Chan cell or," wh o waged a "titani c struggle against destru ctive party strife."60 







enemies, especially the Center Party, to claim that the Fatherland Party did not represent 
all Germans. 
In addition, the constant mention of Bismarck and the "first beloved Emperor" 
usually occurred in patriotic leagues that opposed the new Kaiser and Chancellor Leo von 
Caprivi after the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890.61  This was a way of veiling criticism of 
the present monarch and his government. According to Roger Chickering's study of the 
Pan-Germans, "Bismarck in retirement endowed with his own enormous symbolic capital 
a populistic 'German-national' ideology which he had, as chancellor, resolutely 
opposed."62 How could the party claim to be patriotic and at the same time oppose the 
current administration in the time of war? The leaders of the Fatherland Party, as 
described by Eley' s definition of "national opposition," believed that anyone opposed to 
their ideals, even the Kaiser, was unpatriotic. 
After the publication of the original manifesto, the leaders of the party released a 
second shorter manifesto, which was published in the Deutsche Tageszeitung (a 
newspaper affiliated with the Agrarian League) and twice in the Berliner Neueste 
Nachrichten. The declaration appealed to all "German citizens" to follow the lead of the 
"sorely tired and robust" men of the Eastern Mark, who " during the Freedom Wars a 
hundred years ago" led Germany to victory, in "gathering all the patriotic forces 
together" to defend the Fatherland.63 The manifesto asserted that Germany's "enemies led 
by President Wilson know that they cannot defeat us in war; therefore they rely on the 
61Ibid., 368. 
62Chickering, We Men, 46. 
63"Aufruf der neugegrundeten Deutschen Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), no. 
463, 11 Sept. 1917. 
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Germ an ignor ance [of the actu al st ate of the w ar ]  to swindle their w ay to victory!" 64 "But 
they are wrong," bec ause the Germ an army and n avy rem ain victorious, and the U -Boots, 
the m anifesto announced resolutely, are "dr aining the life -blood out of our enemies."65 
The le aders of the F atherl and P arty admonished Germ ans not to su rrender "wh at 
Bism arck fought for and Hindenburg p reserved " by accepting a "hunger pe ace, which 
would cre ate unbe ar able burdens and sh ackle Germ any for m any centuries," but inste ad 
to fight fo r  a pe ace th at would assure Germ any's "free development and a new 
flourishing " after the w ar.66 
On 14 September, Conr ad von W angenheim, the le ader of the Agr ari an Le ague 
and member of the executive committee of the Germ an F ather land P arty, published h is 
own person al appe al to the people of Germ any. W angenheim encour aged the Germ an 
people to put aside their di fferences c aused by "occup ation, religion, and p arty," in order 
to protect the F atherl and in its time of need .67 He also dem anded th at the "members of 
the Ag rari an League join, en m asse, the Germ an F atherl and P arty and to support it with 
all their might," bec ause the F atherl and P arty st ands for "Germ any's rescue, honor, and 
future."68 
. Following these three announcements, the executive committee of the F atherl and 
P arty scheduled its first public r ally on 24 September in the Berlin Philh armonic. The 








throughout Berlin.69 The rally met with enthusiastic support as hundreds of Berliners 
crammed into the Philharmonic. The first speaker was Duke Albrecht of Mecklenburg, 
the president of the Colonial League and the titular head of the Fatherland Party. 
Albrecht was greeted with long, animated applause as he reached the podium. His speech 
harkened back to August 1914, when all of Germany was said to be united in spirit for a 
German victory. He asked the German people to rediscover this solidarity in order to 
secure victory, which was within reach. Germany, stressed Albrecht, had "achieved 
victories both on land and in the air such as the world has never seen," and it was only 
due to England's venomous propaganda that Germany had to fight "people of all races 
and colors [and] murder instruments of all kinds."70 Albrecht continued triumphantly, 
stating that "we will defeat them, all it takes is for the German people to unite in the same 
way as the soldiers at the front. "7 1 Some in the crowd responded by shouting, "That's 
right."72 Triumphantly, Albrecht told the audience that the Fatherland Party was a 
center for all faithful Germans who have this one goal: to achieve a peace that 
will secure our position in Europe and the world, that will allow our people to 
recover from horrendous losses and sacrifices, that will allow Germany to develop 
freely, and that will assure that no one will dare attack us again. (Vivid 
approval.) 73 
69The advertisement for their first rally appeared on 16 Sept. 1917 in the Vossische 'Zeitung, on the 
19 and 23 Sept. 1917 in the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, the Germania, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
'Zeitung, the Vossische 'Zeitung; and in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger on 23 Sept. 1917. 
7°Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, Deutsche Ziele: Reden bei der ersten offentlichen Parteikundgebung 





Albrecht ended his speech with an appeal for every German man and woman to "gather 
around the Fatherland Party to become a strong union like our heroes at the front ! Heil 
Deutschland ! 74 
Grand Admiral von Tirpi tz followed Duke Albrecht, and his speech focused on 
three issues: the pligh t of the working class, Germany's enemies, and the aims of the 
Fatherland Pa rty. Tirpitz explained that the horrible e ffects of the war had created a need 
to "pr ovide for the poorer c lasses, to secure their social position, and to increase 
tremendously their pa rticipation in state and community issues."75 He added that 
Germany must force the Allies to pay reparations, in order to foil the "victory of Anglo ­
American capitalism " and guarantee the security of the working classes.76 
Shifting the sub ject, Tirpitz described the enemies of Germany and the Fatherland 
Pa rty. Although England (the name Great Britain was ne ver used), France, Russia, and 
(beginning in 1917) America were Germany's enemies, surprisingly the Fatherland P arty 
did not include any references to Russia in its propaganda and only vaguely mentioned 
France, explaining, "If France is against us in this [World War One ], the reasons are 
historic and pathological ." 77 The party reserved most of its propaganda for England and 




nDeutsche Vaterlandspartei, Ziele, 8; I found no references to Russia in the party's descriptions of 
the enemy in the rightist press. This could be because in the fall of 1917, the Fatherland Party no longer 
viewed the Russians as a major threat and decided to focus all its attention on England and America. 
Moreover, France was only mentioned once in the propaganda I studied. 
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The Fatherland Party maintained that the English was "the originator of the world 
conflagration."78 It announced that England started the war because Germany was a 
"strong economic competitor and they did not want to compete peacefully," for all 
Germans know that "for the English the war is a matter of business."79 The party also 
accused England of wanting "to kill the soul of the German people" and of fighting the 
war "in a devilish manner by attempting to kill our innocent women and children through 
hunger to force our men to their knees."80 This argument is significant because it 
revolves around the common idea of German Kultur, as opposed to Western Civilization. 
Germany, before the First World War and later the horrors of World War II and the 
Holocaust, prided itself on its distinct cultural superiority, which Germans referred to as 
Kultur that stood in stark contrast to the Western idea of civilization. To the Germans, 
Civilization represented mundane and artificial phenomena, such as economics and 
technology, while Kultur represented more lofty ideals. In effect, the propaganda of the 
Fatherland Party tried to reinforce an already current image of England as an aggressive, 
materialist, greedy civilization attacking and trying to impose its beliefs on the more 
spiritual, cultured German people. 
Moreover, the Fatherland Party blamed England for forcing or tricking other 
countries into the war against Germany, especially America. Tirpitz, at the party's first 
rally, exclaimed that America had declared war on Germany because it "has become the 
puppet of Anglo-Saxon capitalism," for Germany "from the birth hour forward" has only 
78Lutz, Fall, 369. 
79Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, Ziele, 7; Lutz, Fall, 369. 
8°Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, Ziele, 3 and 8. 
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been friendly towards Ameri ca.81 Ti rpi tz de clared tha t "if Washing ton could des cend 
from Heaven, he would no t tolera te Ameri ca's move." 82 Fu rthermore, the Fa therland 
P arty s ta ted tha t "Germany is leading the fig ht for freedom of the en tire European 
con tinen t agains t the tyranny of Anglo- Ameri canism tha t is devouring everything." 83 
On the topi c  of the Fa therland P arty's a ims, Tirpi tz cla imed tha t the p arty wan ted 
to "ga ther all the for ces of Germany to a ccomplis h one grea t cause [a vi ctorious end to 
the Firs t World War ] and i t  did no t iden tify itself wi th any single organi za tion." 84 
A cknowledging tha t in order to su ccessfully end the war, the German people needed to 
come toge ther, Tirpi tz annou nced triump han tly tha t "mili ta ry and poli ti cal vi ctory is 
already ours; all we need for vi cto ry is to join toge ther wi th all our hear ts and will 
power." 85 
Agrarian leader Conrad von Wangen heim's spee ch began where Tirpi tz left o ff, 
s tressing the impor tan ce of uni ty. Wangen heim claimed tha t German y's enemies were 
trying to s ha tter the uni ty of the German people. T herefore i t  was the obliga tion of the 
Fa therland Par ty "to unify all classes, all par ties, and all religions" in Germany to ensure 
a vi ctorious pea ce. 86 Wangen heim hoped tha t "throug h the fires of war the German 
people would form an unbreakable blo ck" to a ct as a pillar of suppor t for the soldiers a t  
the fron t  and the governmen t. 87 Wangen heim s tressed tha t parliamen tarians ( the 
Rei chs tag majori ty) had los t tou ch wi th the German people and do no t unders tand "how 








to use the people's determination and willingness to sacrifice" to achieve a victory peace 
that would secure Germany's future.88 Wangenheim concluded his speech with a 
passionate appeal for German "inner unity, such as the army is showing in battle" and 
exclaimed: "Kaiser, listen to your people; they will sacrifice anything, endure anything to 
achieve victory."89 
Wolfgang Kapp, the last speaker of the rally, followed the lead of the previous 
speakers by emphasizing the importance of German unity. However, Kapp began his 
speech by reading telegrams from the supporters of the Fatherland Party throughout 
Germany. One telegram, from Bremen carpenter Heinrich Spener, the president of the 
Free Committee for a German Workers' Peace (the same organization that Anton Drexler 
would join before creating the German Workers' Party), stated: 
The new Committee for a German Worker's Peace announces that all of 
its 65,000 members have joined the Fatherland Party. We promise to educate our 
working people in order to strengthen their will to endure until our final victory. 
We trust Hindenburg and the U-Boots. We trust the national spirit within the 
German working people and despite all sacrifices, we will endure the hardships of 
war until Hindenburg declares the job done. 90 
Another telegram, from the town council of Gross-Mellen (a small city in the state of 
Brandenburg), simply read, "We do not want an Erzberger-Scheidemann peace."91  Since 
Erzberger and Scheidemann were the leaders of the Catholic Center and Social 
Democratic parties respectively, this statement made clear that the leaders of Gross­






Ne xt, K app told the audience th at ninety loc al ch apters of the F atherl and P arty 
h ad alre ady been cre ated all over Germ any. According to K app, this tremendous 
response and the fact th at the F atherl and P arty in such a short time recruited "one -third of 
the people behind Scheidem ann," completed the unific ation of the Germ an people behind 
the aims of the F atherl and P arty and in opposition to the p arli ament. 92 Although K app 
e xagger ated gre atly the success of the p arty, its future did indeed seem promising. The 
enemies of the F atherl and P arty, K app insisted, were the p arties without "any faith in 
Germ any's might and endur ance. "93 In contr ast to its enemies, the F atherl and P arty 
w anted to "strengthen the Germ an people 's will for victory" and to "silence the spirit of 
p arty politics and disunity. "94 Moreover, the F atherl and P arty desired to cre ate "peace 
between the city and country and between the middle cl ass and the working cl ass, which 
until now h as sh attered the unity of the Germ an people," by inste ad emph asizing a 
common Germ aness.95 In closing, Kapp told the audience to fight ag ainst the Reichst ag 's 
"st arv ation pe ace ", repe ated his desire to strengthen the people 's will for victory, and 
advised everyone to advertise for the p arty. "Long live the Germ an people, long live the 
K aiser," K app shouted as he left the podium, to which the audience responded by singing 
"Deutschl and Uber all es. "96 
These opening public ations and speeches describe the ide as of the F atherl and 
P arty about its own ch ar acter, which e xemplifies the difference of this p arty to the old 
p arties of the r ight, which h ad followed a "politics of di fference," as elite b astions of 
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social notables rather than as rallying-points for politically energized masses. The 
traditional Conservative Party was unable to transform itself into a mass party, because 
the "legacies of Prussianism, agrarianism, and anti-intellectualism imposed burdens on 
the party that were too heavy to permit the flights of fancy engaged in by Pan-Germanists 
and others in the right-wing vanguard."97 However, in 1917, this "right-wing vanguard" 
realized its goals with the creation of the Fatherland Party, which became the first mass 
party of the right. In addition, this new party's belief in the importance of propaganda 
and its effect on public opinion, has more in common with the European fascist regimes 
of the post-war period than the old-style traditional conservative politics of Imperial 
Germany. 
97 James N. Retallack, Notables of the Right: The Conservative Party and Political Mobilization in 
Germany, 1876-1918 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 4. 
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Chapter IV 
"Germany Wake Up!": The Print Propaganda of the Fatherland Party 
The org ani zers of the F atherl and P arty were new in the intensity of their belief 
th at prop ag and a w as cruci al in controlling public opinion within Germ any. The p arty 
administr ation org ani zed priests , journalists , and te achers to act as tr aveling lecturers 
spre ading the mess age of the p arty th roughout the Reich. They were sent to specific 
regions according to their religion and pl ace of bi rth , the better to m ake cont act with the 
m asses. For ex ample , a C atholic B av ari an would be sent to B av ari a to address a 
predo min antly C atholic audience . K app even suggested letting "sever al lecturers spe ak 
at once in order to re ach a bro ader audience." 98 
The p arty also founded a press dep artment under the control of Dr. Klemens 
Klein , a profession al histori an and the chief editor of the Dusseldoif Zeitung from 1907-
1915, th at dissemin ated prop ag and a vi a newsp apers and other printed medi a. In order to 
re ach the bro adest audience possible , the p arty w anted to publish its prop ag and a in leftist 
and liber al newsp apers , but m any of these newsp apers were not willing to print the 
F atherl and P arty's announcements. As a result of this (sc arcely surprising) refus al, the 
m ajority of the F atherl and P arty ' s prop ag and a w as fou nd in righti st p aper s. Thi s  study 
only focuses on newsp apers published in Berlin, the c apit al of the Reich and he ad qu arters 
of the F atherl and P arty. The prop ag and a cont ai ned in these conserv ative and right-wing 
newsp apers highlighted themes simil ar to those initi ally found in the p arty's first 
m anifesto and public r ally, such as the need to unify the people of Germ any, to incre ase 
98Hagenlilcke, Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, 176. 
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the will to victory within the German population, to ensure the future prosperity of 
Germany by achieving a victory peace, and to reassure the citizens that the German 
military remained strong and triumphant in the field. 
The idea of unity was one of the most frequently recurring topics found in the 
Fatherland Party's propaganda. The party portrayed itself as a patriotic grouping open to 
all Germans regardless of class, race, or party. One article announced that "in the 
German Fatherland Party, a tremendous movement of the people emerges that raises the 
flag of victory as a unifying symbol over all internal conditions."99 In an attempt to 
appeal to as many people as possible, the party claimed that it was "neither conservative 
nor liberal, neither agrarian nor heavy industrialist, neither Army League nor Pan­
German" and that "everybody who wants to help save Germany is welcome !" 100 
Moreover, the party claimed that "members of the German Fatherland Party come from 
all circles of the working, earning (Erwerbenden ), and creating people and from all 
parties." 101 
To add to its appeal, the Fatherland Party linked itself to the Supreme Command 
and the Kaiser to create a comprehensive image of patriotism and obedience to authority 
excluding the Reichstag. The party hoped this stance would be mimicked by the public. 
Field Marshall von Hindenburg, a popular war hero, stated in a letter to the Fatherland 
Party that the hope of "starting a new Burgfrieden" should "stir every German's heart, no 
matter what party they belonged to, and should weld them together in a steady patriotic 
99"Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung (Berlin), no. 11, 20 Nov. 1917. This 
article can also be found in the 22 Oct. 1917 issue of Die Welt am Montag, the 21 Oct. 1917 issue of 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and the 13 Oct. 1917 issue of Vossische Zeitung. 
100Ibid. 
101"Aufruf! Landesverein Gross-Berlin der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei," Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger 
(Berlin), no. 1, 1 Jan. 1918. 
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block (Vaterlandsblock)." 102 Even though some members of the Fatherland Party were 
openly critical of the Kaiser (such as Heinrich Class, who had written a scathing book in 
1913 entitled "If I Were the Kaiser ") in their attempt to achieve German unity, the party 
used the name and the idea of the Kaiser to further its goals. In a telegram to the Kaiser, 
the Fatherland Party claimed that its ultimate goal was to "preserve Germany's welfare " 
and it pledged support to the Kaiser and his "kaiserlich " politics, which would lead to 
victory. 103 Although Wilhelm II did not reply as warmly as Hindenburg did to the 
compliments by the leaders of the Fatherland Party, he did of ficially thank the "East 
Prussian men who gathered to support the welfare of the German Fatherland." 104 
In March 1918, at the acme of German military success in the war, the executive 
committee of the Fatherland P arty sent the Kaiser another telegram congratulating him on 
the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia. It stated that they supported in 
"rock -steady faith " their supreme commander, who will lead Germany to a victorious 
peace that "will steadily build Ge rmany's future at home and abroad." 105 This time, the 
Kaiser 's response to this telegram was much more enthusiastic, as he expressed his 
"highest gratitude " to the men of the Fatherl and Party. 106 
The Fatherland Party wanted to be seen as actively suppor ting the OH L, the 
Kaiser, and to link itself to the greatness of Germany's past (as seen in the original 
manifesto), in order to form a nascent "folk community" within German society by 
ioi.,Hindenburg an die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), no. 474, 17 
Sept. 19 17. 
103"Aufruf der neugegrtindeten Deutschen Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung. 
104"Ein Aufruf filr die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung. 




stressing a unique essential Germandom (Deutschtum). Tirpitz warned Germans not to 
let their enemies "yet again succeed in defeating" them through civil war, as defeat in the 
current "world struggle would lead to the unstoppable downfall of Deutschtum." 107 
Tirpitz admonished the Germans to be aware of their own "inherited evils," especially a 
propensity to internal strife, and encouraged "everybody to use their personal force for 
the sake of the whole, not for personal, selfish gains." 108 While both men and women 
were important to this new community, women, according to Tirpitz, needed to ensure in 
particular that their children learned about "Deutschtum inside and outside of school." 109 
This idea of "essential Germaness" was a means to foster a united "folk community," 
creating an environment where all Germans, regardless of class, region, or religion, could 
come together to work for Germany's common good. 
In order to attract ordinary Germans, especially the working classes, the 
Fatherland Party warned them that the Reichstag majority's peace resolution would 
jeopardize their own economic fortunes and labored to refute the ideas that the Fatherland 
Party wanted to continue the war and opposed internal political reforms. The party's 
propaganda stated that only "a Hindenburg or victory peace" would ensure the safety and 
security of Germany and its people. The Fatherland Party asserted that the Peace 
Resolution of July 1917 was a "peace of renunciation" (Verzichtfrieden), which would 
107 Admiral von Tirpitz, "Wenn es den Feinden wie in alten Zeiten wieder gelingt," Berliner 
Neueste Nachrichten (Berlin), no. 514, 10 Oct. 1917. 
108Ibid. 
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9"Vaterlandspartei und Frauen," Vossische Zeitung (Berlin), no. 532, 18 Oct. 1917. Ironically, 
this newspaper was an organ of the Progressive People's Party. The Progressive Party was a member of the 
Reichstag Majority that created the Peace Resolution of 19 July, which the Fatherland Party adamantly 
opposed. This newspaper contained numerous advertisements and propaganda from the Fatherland Party 
and exemplified perfectly how the Fatherland Party affected many political parties of Imperial Germany. 
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cause "Germany's downfall."110 This downfall would economically cripple the German 
working class and would damage Germany's "position in the world."1 1 1  Moreover, 
during the Fatherland Party's rally in the Berlin Philharmonic, Hamburg businessman 
Mr. J.C. Jensen, the self-proclaimed advocate of the working classes, explained that the 
"sacrifice peace" would destroy the economic viability of the German people and the 
working classes would be especially hard-hit. 112  
The most damaging critique of the Fatherland Party was that it was reactionary 
and therefore against all political reforms, which hurt the party in winning the masses to 
its side. However, the party realized this danger and tried to assure the German 
population that it was apolitical and not reactionary. The leaders of the Fatherland Party 
(whether candidly or not) claimed to stand aside in all political debates and professed that 
internal reforms were not important now that only the will to win to the war was vital to 
Germany's survival. Kapp and Tirpitz's avowed ultimate goal was to end party strife and 
unite the people behind them in a unified block. They argued that the majority parties 
were only attacking the Fatherland Party out of fear because each of these parties was 
"losing its members to the Fatherland Party." 1 1 3  Moreover, the Fatherland Party decreed 
that it had "no internal political goals" and did not want "to revive the times of class 
battles." 1 14 Contradicting a socialist attack that claimed that the Fatherland Party desired 
to deny "constitutional reform for the German people," General Friedrich Wilhelm 
Freiherr von Bissing, a member of the Fatherland Party and former German Governor-
1 10"Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung. 
1 1 1Lutz, Fall, 370. 
1 12Vaterlandspartei, Ziele, 43. 
1 13Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung. 
1 14Ibid. 
37 
Genera l of occupied Be lgium, responded that these a llegations were untrue and that he 
"wou ld leave the par ty if these accusations were co rrect." 1 15 
Whi le Genera l von Bissing made the most forcefu l response to the Father land 
Pa rty's critics, Georg von Be low, a professor of history at the University of Freiburg, had 
the most imaginative. He announced that the Father land Par ty did not be lieve that 
constitutiona l reform was the most pressing issue to discuss during w ar. In fact, Be low 
comp ared the discussion of interna l re form during war time to a man discussing frivo lities 
whi le watching his house bu m down. However, even this man had more sense than those 
demanding po litica l reform because houses "have fire insurance but the German state 
does not." 1 16 
In response to the c laim that one member, Lieutenant- Genera l von K luge, said the 
Father land Par ty was against constitutiona l reforms in Germany, the party administration 
issue d a statement c laiming K luge "simp ly said, 'The Father land Par ty is being fought by 
such peop le who a re striving on ly for immediate democratization, instead of for a fina l 
German victory."' 1 17 The Father land Par ty, the statement continued, "refuses any 
statemen t concerning inn er po li tica l ques tions " and "mere ly s trives for tha t  one aim, 
name ly to strengthen the wi ll for victory in the Ge rman peop le." 1 1 8 
This wi ll for victory meant, for the leaders of the Father land Par ty, to "wake up " 
the German peop le, to make them understand that Germany must emerge from the fires 
of war victorious and stronger than it was at the beginning of the war. For this to occur, 
1 15"Die Angst vor der Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), no. 503, 21 Oct. 1917. 
1 16Georg von Below, Das gute Recht der Vaterlandspartei (Berlin: Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, 
1917), 15. 
1 17"Das Zeil der Deutschen Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), no. 584, 15 
November 1917. 
1 1 8Ibid. 
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all Germans mus t be willing to sacrifice for a 'Hindenburg peace." To gain this 
"Hindenburg peace," the Fa the rland P arty had to "sha tter the Reichs tag ma jori ty" and by 
implica tion weaken the Reichs tag i tself. 1 19 
Ironically, the propaganda of the Fa therland P arty s tressed the hardships and 
sacrifices the people had already made for the war effor t, in order to increase the will to 
vic tory wi thin Germany. The propaganda explained tha t  the "horrendous sacrifices " of 
the pas t years would be for naugh t if Germans accep ted the "hunger peace " of the 
Reichs tag and claimed tha t  only "a peace of vic tory" could redeem these sacrifices. 120 
The leaders of the p arty announced "tha t after three years of war the de termina tion of the 
German people to figh t for a vic tory peace has no t weakened," and expressed their joy in 
the fac t  tha t  no thing would des troy "the will to win " in the German people. 121 Al though 
the leaders of the Fa therland P arty focused on these serious themes to boos t the will for 
vic tory, they were no t agains t using a ttemp ts a t  levi ty and melody to spread their 
message. For ins tance, the following ponderous tune ade qua te !  y summarized the 
Fa therland Party's message regarding the will to vic tory: 
Serious obliga tions are calling us in these hard times. Therefore we are willing to personally sacrifice. 
But we cann ot in the final har d a nd hea te d  figh t  Poli tically sacrifice the reward o f  a German vic tory. 
We an nounce this ye t again A nd we ann ounce i t  frank and free And s tand wi th German Fai th fulness 
1 19"Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung; "Die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," 
Vossische Zeitung (Berlin), no. 577, 11 Nov. 1917. This second piece was also found in the Berliner 
Lokal-Anzeiger and the Deutsche Tageszeitung. 
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Behind the Fatherland Part y. 1 22 
The will to victor y was supposed to achieve a peace for German y that would 
protect "what Bismarck fought for and Hindenburg preserved." 1 23 However, in realit y, 
the victor y peace championed b y  the Fatherland Part y aimed for much more. The victor y 
peace was intended to ensure German y's future prosperit y, econo micall y and defensivel y, 
providing all that "German y needs for its development after its horrible bloodletting " 
during the First World War. 1 24 The Fatherland Part y couched its annexationist aims in 
terms of its vision of a victor y peace. For instance, the opening announcement of the 
Brandenburg Provincial Branch of the Fatherland Part y stated that in order for "our sons 
and grandsons " to live in "a proud, free countr y," "Belgium must not again become a 
vassal state of England "; instead, it must come under German in fluence . 1 25 In even more 
clear terms, the Fatherland Pa rt y  announced that it expected the following things to be 
achieved during the peace negotiations with Russia: 
the militar y securit y of our borders, the necessar y lands for settlements in order to strengthen the power of the people, which has been weakened b y  the tremendous blood sacrifice of the war, the stead y positioning of the German forces at the Baltic Sea, the freedom of movement for all Germans and the sec ure protection of the cult ural and economic work of our neighbor countries. 126 
Yet again, Professor von Below provided the most e ye-opening statements 
regarding annexations in his pamphlet Das gute Recht der Vaterlandspartei, where he 
outlined the annexation designs of the Fatherland Pa rty in the Eastern and Western 
1917. 
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Eur ope. He proclaimed that "the Fatherland Party demands the guarantee of a 
tremendous German in fluence in the East," which included the lands of Kurland, 
Lithuania, and Estonia. 127 Analyzing the argument of the Progressive Party's 
re presentative in the Reichstag Georg Gothein that Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania should 
be given to Poland, Below re plied that this plan would be harmful to Germany's future, 
because it would "sacrifice good agricultural land, which could also be used for German 
settlements ." 128 
On the issue of Belgium, Below ex plained that the Fatherland Party desired to 
control the Flemish-s pea king areas, which had always been a goal of Al fred von Tir pit z. 
Tir pit z believed that Germany had to gain control of the Flanders coast to achieve naval 
parity with England . The Fatherland Party, following a plan by General von Bissing, 
ho ped for hostility between the Flemings and Walloons ( French-s pea king Belgians) in 
Bel gium, because in fluential members of the party believed that once the Flem ings 
achieved inde pendence, they would naturally, "in order to have a bright future," join the 
Reich . 129 
In addition to te rritory, the Fatherland Party demanded re parations from the 
Entente to ensure Germany's economic viability. Professor Below wrote that the German 
government should demand war re parations to guarantee "a flourishing develo pment " of 
the German economy after the war and anyone who disagreed was a "Dummko pf." 1 30 In 
127Below, Das gute Recht, 3-4. 
128Ibid., 4. 129Ibid., 10- 1 1 . 
130Ibid., 8. 
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conclusion, Below warned the German people that a peace without reparations or 
annexations would make Germany appear weak in the eyes of its enemies. 13 1 
One of the main problems facing the Fatherland Party in its mission to improve 
the will for victory and achieve a "Hindenburg peace" was the belief held by some 
discouraged sections of German society that World War I was turning in the favor of the 
Allies. While this sentiment might have been accurate, as exemplified by America's 
declaration of war on Germany in April and the success of the British blockade, there was 
also seeming evidence to the contrary. For instance, during the summer of 1917 French 
troops went on strike (although not known at the time by Germans), the Third Battle of 
Ypres gained no considerable advantage for the Allies, and American troops had yet to 
arrive on the continent in force (German naval officers promised to prevent all American 
landings). Moreover, on 3 December 1917, following the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia, Lenin's government signed an armistice with Germany. Hence, there was ample 
evidence that could be exploited to make the German people believe that victory was 
within grasp and this was exactly what the Fatherland Party did with its depictions of the 
German military as strong and victorious in the field of battle. 
The leadership of the Fatherland Party explained that the war was going well for 
Germany as "our armies are fighting victoriously at the front, our navy is unshakeable, 
and our U-Boots, being certain of victory, are draining the life-blood of our enemies." 1 32 
Backing up this statement, Hindenburg told the German people excitedly during the fall 
13 1Ibid., 9. 
132"Aufruf der neugegrundeten Deutschen Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung. 
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of 1917 that victory was in the air.133 Furthermore, the Fatherland Party proclaimed that, 
"out in the fields, heroism and the sacrifice of our brothers shines with a brighter 
brilliance and the helplessness of our enemies becomes more and more apparent as the 
efficiency of our U-Boots and Luftwaffe becomes more and more deadly."134 The 
Brandenburg Provincial Branch of the Fatherland Party described, in even more detail, 
the state of war in November 1917: 
After the forcible occupation of Riga and Osei, after the incomparable stroke of 
genius in the break-through from the Isonzo to the Tagliamento, with its 
immeasurable military and political results, and considering the inflexible 
resistance of our heroes on the Western front, we at home have really now only 
one duty-not to jeopardize the victorious issue by our behavior. It is not for 
Germany and her allies but for the enemy to speak now if they want to negotiate. 
We can afford to wait for that after the brilliant results of the Seventh War Loan, 
and knowing that our economic supplies are assured. Russia is done for, and Italy 
will soon be done for, too. France has half bled to death in England's service and 
England herself is full of apprehension and is fighting our submarines, watch in 
hand.1 35 
It is not difficult to understand how many German people could be duped into 
believing that victory was within reach with these vivid descriptions of the glorious state 
of the German military. The fact that the German people endured through the fourth year 
of the war, facing increasing destitution, without any massive riots or revolutions shows 
that at least a significant portion of the population trusted this type of propaganda. 
Another belated testament to the strength of this propaganda is that many Germans were 
unwilling to accept defeat even years after the First World War ended as shown in the 
wide-spread belief in the stab-in-the-back legend and the cult of the military that later 
flourished in the Weimar Republic. 
133"Hindenburg an die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung. 
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The Fatherland Party's  propaganda that emphasized unity and a powetful military 
did have a profound effect on the German population, as represented by the fact that the 
Fatherland Party gained an impressive number of members (although likely not as many 
as claimed). Moreover, after the formation of the Fatherland Party, the Reichstag 
Majority did not make any more peace overtures. Although there were many other 
reasons for not issuing other peace proposals, such as the lack of a favorable response 
from the international community to the first announcement, the fact that it received an 
unfavorable reception from parts of society inside of Germany also played a role. What 
would be the outcome of the Fatherland Party attacking the majority parties in an attempt 
to win the battle of public opinion? In an attempt to answer this question, one must 
examine the countermovement the Fatherland Party inspired. 
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Chapter V 
Eight Months of Agitation: The Social Democratic Party's Clash with the 
Fatherland Party 
The Fa therland Par ty, wi th i ts a ttack on the poli tical sys tems of the Reichs tag, 
a ttrac ted cri ticism from many fron ts . The Na tional Liberals, al though spli t by the 
forma tion of Ti rpi tz's par ty, did voice some opposi tion, as shown in the crea tion of the 
People's Associa tion for Freedom and Fa therland, whose "spiri tual leaders were Berlin 
Professors E. Troel tsch, Meinecke, and Herker." 136 This organi za tion wan ted to recrea te 
the Burgfrieden of 1914 and, unlike the Fa ther land Par ty, suppor ted in ternal reforms . 
Howe ver, this associa tion ne ver gained more than one thousand members and "e ven 
a ttemp ted to merge wi th the German Fa therland Par ty" in the final days of the w ar.1 37 
The People's Ass ocia tion failed, according to Meinecke, because "many bourgeois 
elemen ts a t  this time joined the Fa therland Par ty wi th li vely en thusiasm, under the 
illusion tha t  i t  represen ted the true na tional in teres ts." 138 
One would assume tha t  the three par ties tha t  formed the Reichs tag Ma jori ty and 
drafted the Peace Resolu tion of July 1917 would s tand firm agains t the Fa therland Par ty, 
which s trongly and vehemen tly agi ta ted agains t their resolu tion and desire for in ternal 
re forms. Ye t, surprisingly, this was no t exac tly the case. Bo th the Progressi ve Par ty and 
the Cen ter Par ty in fac t  responded ambi valen tly towards the Fa therland Par ty. Al though 
the Pr ogressi ve Par ty urged i ts members no t to join the Fa therland Par ty, some prominen t 
136Wortmann, Geschichte, 94. 
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138Meinecke, Catastrophe, 29. 
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Progressive Party members, such as Dr. Korte and Dr. Direchlet, were among the first to 
join it. 139 Even more shocking, one of the Progressive Party's official newspapers, the 
Vossische Zeitung, published propaganda from the Fatherland Party in abundance. The 
party's other paper, the Berliner Tageblatt, while not covering the Fatherland Party 
warmly, did not speak out against it harshly either. It only contained one article that 
represented the Fatherland Party negatively. 
The Center Party stated in its party newspaper, Gennania, that the Fatherland 
Party was "not a unifier because it caused internal fragmentation" and explained that the 
name "Vaterland" implied that only ethnic Germans were welcome. 140 The issue of 
ethnicity was important to the leaders of the Center Party because some of the party's 
members came from non-German Catholics, such as the Poles, living within the borders 
of the Germany. The Center Party also "explicitly declared that each and every 
committee member of the Center refused and will continue to refuse to join the German 
Fatherland Party." 141 Even though no "committee" members enlisted in the Fatherland 
Party, "a number of prominent Centrists, mostly of the aristocratic right wing, became 
members of Kapp's organization." 142 Moreover, Gennania published some propaganda 
and advertisements from the Fatherland Party, although not as extensively as the 
Vossische Zeitung. 
In contrast to the Center and Progressive parties, the SPD responded vigorously 
and fervently against the founding of the Fatherland Party from the beginning, for a 
number of reasons. First, the SPD did not have many members join the Fatherland Party. 
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Second, the S P D, unlike the Centrists and Progressives, had no ma jor internal 
disagreements over the Peace Resolution of 19 July. Third, the S P D  reacted violently 
against the Fatherland Party's trying to recruit members from the working class, the 
traditional strength of the S P D (even though only roughly one-third of German workers 
were socialists). Lastly, once the S P D  reali zed that the Fatherland Party was not making 
inroads into the working class, it began to use the negative image of the Fatherland Party, 
which the S P D  had created in its propaganda, as a means to try to repair its own inte rnal 
schism of March 1916. For these reasons, the S P D 's propaganda campaign against the 
Fatherland Party was massive and quite successful in shaping socialist workers ' opinions 
of Tirpi t z' s par ty. 
A conceptual tool from sociological theory that helps explain why the S P D 's 
propaganda may have been successful in shaping the socialist workers ' opinions is Ellul ' s 
theory of "psychological crystalli zation." This theory explains the attitudes of individuals 
already under the in fluence of an ideology or set of values. Ellul states that this process 
in an individual "closes his mind to all new ideas " and this "usually takes on an ironic 
aspect: the man who has been successfully sub jected to a vigorous propaganda will 
declare that all new ideas are propaganda." 143 "Psychological crystalli zation " applies to 
the members of the S P D  and other sympathetic workers because they were already pre ­
indoctrinated by socialist ideology and there fore would tend to view the statements of the 
Fatherland Pa rty as p ropaganda. 
The S P D 's counter -propaganda against the Fatherland Party was disseminated in 
large part on the pages of Vorwiirts, the official party medium . Ellul 's theory of 
1431bid., 166. 
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"psyc hological crystallization " applies to t his propaganda because "t he S P D  press 
preac hed to t he converted . .  i t  was boug ht and read largely by party members ."144 
Moreover, Vorwlirts had a wide readers hip, because i t  had a print run of 165,000 copies 
daily in 1912  and ot her smaller socialist publications reprinted its ar ticles and 
propaganda . 145 T he propaganda found in Vorwlirts c haracterized t he Fat herland Party as 
t he class enemy, by stating t hat t he new party was just a new name for an old foe, t he 
Pan-Germans, and describing t he party's elite in terms t hat workers would understand 
and re ject, suc h as forceful bosses and intolerant religious aut horities. 
On 8 September 1917, t he first article about t he Fat herland Party appeared in 
Vorwlirts. T he article, entitled ''T he New Party ! A Mas querade of t he Pan- Germans," 
used t he analogy of an actor c hanging costumes to describe t he new pa rty. T he title 
activates "psyc hological crystallization," because previous prewar socialist propaganda 
had already muc h earlier identified t he Pan- Germans as antagonists. T he Pan-Germans 
had earlier contended t hat "Social Dem ocracy was simply t he most ominous t hing 
conceivable, t he original evil, t he repudiation of order."146 T he S P D  did not want 
wor kers an d o ther members of the par ty to be foole d by the "new cos tume " of the Pan ­
Germans. 147 T he a rticle continuously followed t his t heme, explaining to t he ca dres of t he 
S P D  t hat t hey would "realize at first sig ht, we are once again faced wit h a metamorp hosis 
of t he Pan- Germans. Proof is t he names of its leaders . "148 T hese leaders were 
recognized as Admiral von Tirpitz and Wolf gang Kapp and t he piece reminded its 
144Stefan Berger, The British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), 104. 
145Welch, Germany, 265. 
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audience of thei r past involvement in the Pan- Ge rman League. Anothe r sto ry desc ribed 
"M r. Kapp as the soul of the new pa rty" who "t ries to sti r up the new Chancello r against 
the Reichstag." 149 The Socialists and thei r allies dominated the cu rrent Reichstag, so 
Kapp and his new pa rty's machinations to dest roy this coalition placed them in di rect 
opposition to the goals and aims of the S P D. In essence, the Fathe rland Pa rty became the 
new a rchetypal enemy of the socialists, stepping into the role ea rlie r played by the Pan ­
Ge rmans . 
Despite ha rsh t reatment in the socialist p ress, �he Fathe rland Pa rty still attempted 
to place adve rtisements in the Vorwarts and othe r wo rke rs '  publications, fully e xpecting 
to be denied access to this medium and make capital of thei r e xclusion, and indeed, the 
edito rs of socialist newspape rs re fused to p rint the adve rtisements fo r the Fathe rland 
Pa rty. Howeve r, the edito r of Vorwarts d id p rint the pa rty's statement about the denial. 
The Fathe rland Pa rty c rowed that socialist "pape rs fea red thei r own reade rs and p refe r 
caution ove r b rave ry." 1 50 The autho r of the a rticle replied, ''This, of cou rse, is an 
impe rtinent m is rep resentation," because the Vorwarts 's sta ff cove red the founding of the 
pa rty ea rlie r, even e xplaining thei r aims and goals . 1 5 1  The edito r of Vorwarts went on to 
cla rify: Vorwarts and othe r publications "only refused to p rint the adve rtisement of the 
Ge rman Fathe rland Pa rty to avoid any suspicion that they could be co rrupted by the 
money that the Fathe rland Pa rty th rows a round right and left." 152 
Socialists also began to complain about religious figu res u rging thei r flocks to 
enlist in the new Fathe rland Pa rty. To show the c rude natu re of such p ropaganda, the 
149"Wer ist Kapp?," Vorwiirts (Berlin), 10 Sept. 1917. 




S P D  a ctually printed the appeal by the pastor of a chur ch in Nieders ch onhausen (a 
se ction of the Pankow distri ct in Berlin) in Vorwarts without any commentary or 
abridgement. The announ cement read as follows : 
And what are you doing for Germany's great hour ? 1. Give your gold to the Fatherland And 2. Sign the i11 War loan And 3. Are you already a member of the German Fatherland Party? N o-n o-no ? How will you pass in front of your Fatherland, your cons cien ce, and your God ? Well, who is not yet a member of the Fatherland Party, cannot pass in front of Nieders ch onhausen or in front of his God . And remember, at heaven's gate they che ck the membership books [ of the Fathe rland Party] . 153 
Soon after the founding of the Fatherland P arty, con cerned workers began to write to 
S P D  leaders, complaining of industry managers pressuring them to join the new party. 
One con cerned employee wrote that his boss at a lo cal government agen cy "condu cted a 
survey among his sub je cts about who wanted to attend the founding gathering of the 
German Fatherland Party."154 The "sub je ct" went on to explain that the fliers for the 
event contained on the ba ck a membership card; in desperation the distraught worker 
"as ked what one cou ld do against su ch for ce ful a ctions ." 155 The edi tors of Vorwarts 
replied, "no man shall be for ced to join a politi cal party and that no honorable man would 
a low himself to be for ced ." 156 Another story related how the management of the Berlin ­
based Fatherland Co ffee Shop tried to persuade its employees to enlist in the Fatherland 
Party and o ffered to pay for their employee's membership dues. The arti cle announ ced 
153"Der liebe Gott ftir die Vaterlandspartei," Vorwiirts (Berlin), 4 Oct. 1917. 




enthusiastically, "Nevertheless, not a single waiter has signed!" 1 57 The SPD stated it 
would take the issue of governmental sponsorship of advertisements and employers' 
pressure to join Tirpitz' s party before the Reichstag. 
On 6 October 1917, Otto Landsberg, a socialist deputy, made a speech in the 
Reichstag against the Fatherland Party's dissemination of its propaganda in the army and 
other governmental institutions without governmental censor. He spoke to support the 
recent "Socialist interpellation concerning Admiral von Tirpitz and the new German 
Fatherland Party." 158 Landsberg complained: 
clergymen and the State authorities agitated among the population on behalf of 
the Fatherland Party, and ... army officers, by speeches and the distribution of 
pamphlets, carried on a propaganda among the soldiers against the Reichstag 
[peace] resolution. 159 
To reinforce his argument against officially sanctioned party propaganda, he informed the 
Reichstag that the government had censored socialist publications, while "the Pan­
German agitations, however, were regarded with favor." 160 Echoing earlier socialist 
propaganda, Landsberg called the Fatherland Party a mere front for the Pan-Germans and 
said that "at the head of this party there are men who hitherto-I will use parliamentary 
language-have not suffered through the war," but only wished to profit from it. 16 1 
These profits included annexations and inflated dividends from producing war materials, 
157"Kaffee-Vaterlandspartei !," Vorwtirts (Berlin), 27 Sept. 1917. 
158"Reichstag Uproar Against Ministers," New York Times, 7 Oct. 1917. I am using the New York 
Times as a supplementary source because it extensively covered the political infighting that occurred in 
Germany during the last year of the war. In addition, the New York Times and the Times of London were 
useful in gleaming information about the German strikes at the end of January 1918 and the beginning of 
February 1918, because the German government censored most liberal and socialist newspapers shortly 
before and immediately following the strikes. Despite the obvious biases of newspapers published in 
countries at war with Germany, their value as a source outweighs any of these problems. 
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since the leaders of the new party were members of the landed aristocracy and upper­
middle class industrialists. Landsberg provided numerous examples of military officers 
actively soliciting for the Fatherland Party and even in passing mentioned the notorious 
appeal from the pastor of Niederschonhausen. Landsberg ended his speech by appealing 
to the Imperial Chancellor "not to allow the direction of affairs to be taken out of his 
hands" and warned that the "welfare of the Empire will depend to a very great extent on 
his attitude."162 Landsberg's speech elicited cheers from the Socialists and outrage from 
the Conservatives. 
By applying Ellul's theory of "psychological crystallization," we can better 
understand how the socialist propaganda likely affected the indoctrinated socialist in 
regards to the Fatherland Party. The first two months of socialist propaganda in the 
Vorwiirts (which reprinted the speeches given in the Reichstag regarding the Fatherland 
Party and its propaganda) laid the foundation for how members of the SPD were 
supposed to view this new party. The rhetoric used in the socialist propaganda created a 
profoundly negative stereotype of the Fatherland Party. Socialists should now think of it 
as merely a new embodiment of the old Pan-Germans, who opposed socialism on 
principle, and wanted to destroy the Reichstag majority and the Peace Resolution of July 
1917. In addition, the socialist propaganda presented the leaders of the Fatherland Party 
in old terms familiar to workers, as bosses who pressure their employees, in this case to 
enroll in the Fatherland Party. According to the concept of "psychological 
crystallization," the indoctrinated socialist should regard the Fatherland Party as the 
enemy and therefore, could be motivated to oppose this new party, while even further 
162Ibid., 138. 
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cementing his socialist commitment. The fact that socialist propaganda changed its 
trajectory, becoming more action-driven (meaning that the propaganda was intended to 
invoke a response in the targeted subject, after the original announcement and 
descriptions of the Fatherland Party) proves the usefulness of Ellul's theory in regards to 
the effectiveness of socialist propaganda. 
The SPD's propaganda became more action-driven in early November 1917 as it 
came to the conclusion that the Fatherland Party was not succeeding in reaching the 
masses. However, the creation of the Fatherland Party, along with the SPD's powerful 
anti-Fatherland Party propaganda, instigated a grass-roots movement against this new 
right-wing party, which the SPD was quick to take advantage of in order to repair the 
damage done to the socialist movement by the formation of the USPD. This instructive 
propaganda urged SPD members to protest and break up Fatherland Party meetings, 
which later escalated into the radicalism expressed during the general strike in Berlin and 
throughout Germany at the end of January 1918. Moreover, the editors of Vorwarts used 
the anti-Fatherland Party propaganda to solicit new members and hopefully win the 
loyalty of some USPD members. Out of the four advertisements bidding people to join 
the SPD found in the Vorwarts, from October 1917 through April 1918, three dealt 
exclusively with the Fatherland Party, while the theme of the fourth was the unequal 
distribution of the tax burden to pay for the war. 
In mid-October 1917, the SPD ran an advertisement encouraging workers to join 
the SPD that read as follows: 
The Fatherland Party and its hypocritical propaganda are poisoning the 
German political life. It is the obligation of the working classes to close ranks and 
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to fight for peace and progress; therefore in defiance of the Fatherland Party 
become members of the Social Democratic Party.163 
The passage explicitly urges the working class to "close ranks" or in other words to 
reunite the two socialist movements into one mass organization that could defeat the 
Fatherland Party. This theme continued for the next seven months, but became more 
streamlined. Later, the advertisements actually functioned as membership registration 
forms as well. An announcement in February, which was much more passionate than the 
first, read: 
It is our enemies who under the misleading name of the Fatherland Party 
want to continue the war for eternity. We have to defeat them! And we will 
defeat them, if we unite in the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Anyone who 
wants this please fill out the following. 




The third advertisement had the same theme as the first one that appeared in October, but 
in addition, it too contained a membership registration at the end of the advertisement. 
The fact that seventy-five percent of the announcements urging readers to enroll in the 
SPD used the name of the Fatherland Party goes a long way to proving that the appeal 
was effective and that the rank and file of the party opposed the idea of this "patriotic 
party." It would seem that socialist propaganda succeeded in establishing the desired 
stereotype in regard to the Fatherland Party and used it as a motivation to action,, in the 
direction of outbidding their opponent' s  claims to mass legitimacy. 
163Vorwarts (Berlin), 14 Oct. 1917. 
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The political clash between the Fatherland Party and the SPD reached a climax 
between November 1917 and February 1918. These two parties fought for influence 
within the Imperial bureaucracy, and even more importantly, struggled over the ongoing 
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, as the newly formed Bolshevik regime in Rus�ia agreed to 
a cease-fire. The negotiations continued until 3 March 1918, when after a massive 
German advance, the Bolsheviks finally signed the dictated and harsh peace treaty. The 
national leadership of majority SPD abstained from voting for the treaty, but did not vote 
against it because they "were not prepared for a showdown with the Imperial government 
over war aims" and, in reality, many SPD members actually supported the treaty, due to 
the fact that a strong right wing had developed in the party after the many leftist members 
joined the USPD. 165 The terms of the treaty seemed to parallel the annexationist aims of 
the Fatherland Party, which desired the Baltic lands and frontier territories inhabited by 
Poles. Although the members of majority SPD silently supported the treaty of Brest­
Litovsk (only the Independent Socialists rejected the treaty), throughout December and 
March, Vorwarts continuously agitated against the dictatorial tone of the peace talks. 166 
While this agitation failed to influence the outcome of the peace settlement, it did arouse 
popular feeling at home. 
During these months, the management of Vorwarts crafted propaganda that 
warned the working classes that if the "complete program of annexation in the east and 
west" were realized, it would cause "inner political consequences," which would "have 
165John L. Snell, "Wilson's Peace Program and German Socialism, January-March 191 8," The 
Mississip�i Valley Historical Review 38, no. 2 (Sept., 195 1): 1 88. 
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St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), 384. 
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[an] enormous [negative] effect on the working classes." 167 Additionally, the socialist 
press warned its readers that the Fatherland Party wanted "to fight democracy, 
parliamentary reform, and the equal right to vote. In short any improvement or progress 
when it comes to inner politics."168 The reference to inner politics referred to the 
Kaiser's tepid Easter promise of 1917 to reform the Prussian suffrage system, which had 
not yet came to pass, and was an issue that the Fatherland Party agitated against. Another 
propaganda article referred to Tirpitz' s party "acting like a bull in a china shop" at a 
meeting in Berlin discussing the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk by demanding a powerful 
German presence on the Baltic Sea for the "military security of Germany's borders." 169 
The article advised the government not to "follow the Fatherland Party because there 
would not be peace, only shattered china." 170 
At the same time this political conflict raged, the more active socialists began 
protesting 
at and disrupting Fatherland Party meetings and rallies throughout Germany. On 15 
January 1918, a Fatherland Party rally of about three thousand people in Mannheim "was 
frustrated by the Socialists" and later "dispersed by the police amid Socialist cheers." 17 1 
On the same day, socialists interrupted another meeting in Jena and "after passing a vote 
for 'a general peace by understanding' threw out the members of the Fatherland Party." 172 
On the following day, "as soon as the Chairman of a big meeting that had been called in 
Frankfort mentioned the Fatherland Party a tumult broke out and rioting followed. The 
167"War of Factions Grows in Germany," New York Times, 16 Jan. 1918. 
168"Die innere Politik der Vaterlandspartei," Vorwiirts (Berlin), 6 Jan. 1918. 
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police finally had to disperse the meeting." 1 73 Two weeks later, on 27 January, an article 
in the New York Times stated: 
The most interesting feature of the German situation today is the campaign 
of the Fatherland Party and the great popular countercampaign [sic] . In countless 
cases, and in all the big cities, the meetings of that organization have been broken 
up, to the accompaniment of shouts for peace and singing of the 'Marsellaise. ' 174 
This popular mass mobilization of the socialists, of which the clashes with the Fatherland 
Party were a part, culminated in an attempt at a general German strike at the end of 
January and the beginning of February. The Imperial government continuously banned 
or censored Vorwiirts and other liberal newspapers throughout January and February 
19 18  because it feared these newspapers would entice the German workers to strike in 
support of the Austrian work stoppage that began on 16  January 1918 .  Therefore, most 
of the news regarding the strikes was found in foreign newspapers and non-leftist 
publications within Germany. 
The German government was right to worry over the possibility of a strike in 
Germany, because the day after Independent Socialist Adolf Hoffmann told the Prussian 
Diet "Let events in Austria be a warning," the strikes began. 175 The strikes started at the 
Torpedo Yard in Kiel and in only a few days spread throughout Germany. At the Krupp 
works in Essen, it was alleged that "200 strikers forced 60,000 workers to strike," and on 
29 January workers at the Vulcan shipyards in Hamburg went on strike. 176 In Berlin, 
discontented workers protested for immediate ratification of the Prussian suffrage reform 
bill. Foreign newspapers reported that throughout Germany 500,000 workers were on 
173"German Factions in Truce on Spoils," New York Times, 17 Jan. 1918. 
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strike; however, the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung insists that only youths are on 
strike" and official government reports declared that the strikers never exceeded 
185,000.177 However, Vorwarts later claimed that there were in excess of 300,000 
strikers. Regardless of the size of the work stoppage, the strikers had four demands that 
they stated in the media of the Central Committee of trade unions: 
First-An answer by the German Government to the speech made by 
Lloyd George to the deputation of English trade unions. 
Second-The fixing of German war aims in the west. 
Third-The serious attention of the Government to the demand that in the 
peace negotiations there shall be direct representation of the working-class 
interests in full proportion to the representation of capitalistic interests. 
Fourth-No further postponement of Prussian franchise reform. 1 78 
The second, third, and fourth demands are extremely important, because the SPD and the 
Fatherland Party were currently fighting over these issues. The second demand clarified 
the workers' opposition to the Fatherland Party's desire to annex Belgium and Flanders, 
because the workers claimed that they "only supported the war because they believed it a 
war of defense" and they were not "bleeding and dying for Courland, Lithuania, Longwy, 
and Briey, [or] for the destruction of Belgium's independence." 179 The third and fourth 
stipulation explained that the working class wanted more representation in the 
government. As another testament to the workers' hatred of the Fatherland Party, 
Wilhelm Dittman, an Independent Socialist on trail for treason for instigating the strikes, 
"declared that the strike broke out as the result of a 'social elemental event,' the 
reaction . . .  against the policy of the Fatherland Party and the Pan-Germans." 1 80 
mibid; Verhey, Spirit of 1914, 225. 
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Furthermore, Dittman claimed that "the German workers considered Admiral von Tirpitz 
the intellectual originator of the strike." 1 8 1  
Despite the fact that the majority SPD joined with Independent Socialists in 
support of the workers, the strikes never attained any unity, and with this failure any hope 
of once again unifying the socialist movement died. However, these disruptions 
throughout Germany worried Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to the point that they 
threatened to use military force to quell the strikes. On 3 February, the military 
commandant of Brandenburg, General von Kessel, released the following statement: 
"Employees failing to resume work will be tried by court-martial, which is authorized to 
impose the sentence of death, execution to take place within twenty-four hours of the 
time of sentence imposed." 1 82 The strike ended the next day without any concessions by 
the government. 
Despite the fact that the popular counter-campaign against the Fatherland Party 
failed to influence the government to change its course in the war, to enact political 
reform, or unify the socialist movement, it is still a testament to the importance and 
effectiveness of the socialist propaganda. The SPD's propaganda disseminated in its 
official newspaper, the Vorwarts, taught its cadres how to view and think about the 
Fatherland Party. Next, the Socialist Party used this propaganda as negative 
reinforcement to call workers to action, either to join SPD or to break up meetings of 
Tirpitz 's party. Moreover, socialist leaders used the extreme militarism and elitism of the 
Fatherland Party to unify workers in attempting a general strike in order to achieve its 
181Ibid. 
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real economic and political goals. These goals included "more food at lower prices, an 
end to the black market, prosecution of war profiteers," a quick end to the war and 
democratic reforms in Prussia. 1 83 




The study of this new, active political public, represented paradoxically by both 
the German Fatherland Party and the countermovement it inspired, is crucial to 
understanding how the disintegration and fragmentation of German politics during World 
War I led to the later political conflicts that defined the Weimar Republic. As implicit 
splits that had opened during the war deepened, members of the extreme left faction of 
the Socialist Party went on to found the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) on 31 
December 1918, whose goal was to create a communist regime similar to Russia's in 
Germany. The radical right, which had formed the core of the Fatherland Party, also 
caused later disturbances in Weimar Germany. For example, Kapp attempted (but failed) 
to overthrow the newly formed democratic German government in a miserable coup in 
March 1920. Furthermore, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) 
under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, but earlier founded by Anton Drexler, a former 
member of the Munich branch of the Fatherland Party, tried to bring down Germany's 
representative government in the ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. Ten years later, the 
machinations of the Nazis and Communists, in large part an outgrowth of the earlier 
conflicts between the Fatherland Party and the Left in the First World War, would shut 
down the parliamentary system, ultimately leading to the appointment of Hitler as 
German Chancellor. 
Obviously, the main players in both the extreme-radical fringe of the right and left 
caused disruptions during the Weimar years, but how far back did their radicalism go? 
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And mor e importantly, at l east for this topic, was th e Fath erland Party proto- or pr e­
fascist as so many historians hav e argu ed ?  To b egin with, sinc e th e t erms proto- or pr e­
fascist lack a singl e d efinitiv e d efinition, th ey ar e not us eful as conc eptual tools . It is b est 
to simply ask wh eth er th e Fath erland Party was its elf fascist or at l east had fascist 
charact eristics . In ord er to answ er this qu estion, a us eful d efinition of fascism is n eed ed .  
Drawing on works on fascism by Hannah Ar endt, Martin Blinkho m, and Ian K ershaw, 
on e can cat egoriz e fascism as a political mov em ent l ed by extr em e  nationalist 
r evolutionari es who d esir e a national r ebirth, aim to cr eat e a party abov e parti es that 
gains mass app eal, and plan to impl em ent authoritarian rul e. 1 84 Following this d efinition, 
examination of th e Fath erland Party's propaganda shows that th e party did in fact contain 
fascist el em ents . For exampl e, th e l ead ers of th e Fath erland Party claim ed to b e  abov e 
party politics and to b e  a mov em ent of th e p eopl e aiming to cr eat e a r ebirth in G erman 
soci ety. How ev er, b ecaus e th e party n ev er achi ev ed pow er, it would b e  hard to d efin e th e 
party as fully, functionally fascist . Mor eov er, to argu e that th e party was a pr ecursor to 
Nazism would in a s ens e b e  to assum e p erv ers ely that Nazism was th e only outcom e 
possib le in postwar Germany. 
How ev er, whil e th er e  ar e c ertain asp ects of th e Fath erland Party, such as 
id eology, organizat ion, and propaganda that contain ed fascist el em ents, th e entir e d ebat e 
ov er th e party's status as a pr ecursor to Nazism is not a valid on e for a vari ety of r easons . 
Most important is th e fact that whil e th er e  was an id eological foundation for Nazism 
pr es ent in Imp erial G ermany, Nazism could not hav e evolv ed without particular ev ents in 
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the post-war period, including the Treaty of Versailles, the stab-in-the-back legend, the 
Great Depression, and the political infrastructure of the Weimar Republic. 1 85 
Regardless of how important the earlier discussion on the Fatherland Party's  
relationship to Nazism is to German history, scholarship on the Fatherland Party needs to 
move beyond a fixation on this stalemated traditional argument, since it can never be 
completely resolved, in order to gauge other vital issues surrounding the party. The fact 
that the majority of the rightist voluntary associations of ;cmperial Germany joined 
together to form a mass movement that ostensibly desired to create a cohesive, unified 
German public is essential to understanding the evolution of the German Right from an 
exclusive bastion of the nobles and the landed elite to the more popular and radical 
notions of the Right in the Weimar years. Moreover, evaluating the attempt to direct 
public opinion through the Fatherland Party's  propaganda is critical to understanding 
why the German population was willing to endure through the last grueling years of the 
First World War. 
David Welch argued, in Sins of Omission, that Germany' s propaganda during the 
First World War was in fact, in contrast to the long-held view of its ineffectiveness, 
sophisticated and able to meet the needs of the people. This seems to be true for the 
propaganda of Germany's two largest political parties as well, as both the propaganda of 
the Fatherland Party and the SPD resonated with many Germans, which led to a polarized 
political landscape in wartime Imperial Germany. Princess Evelyn Blticher, the English­
born wife of Count Blticher, the German Ambassador to England, aptly described this 
1850n the ideological origins of Nazism in the Second Empire, see George Mosse, The Crisis of 
German Ideology: The Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Howard Fertig, 1964). 
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volatile situation by writing in her diary that II All internal disputes and disagreements are 
disappearing for the moment, being swallowed up in the vital conflict of the two great 
parties, the democrats [SPD] and the 'Vaterlandspartei, '  which is daily increasing in 
vehemence. 11 1 86 
This clash, thus, helps to explain why the representatives of the Right and Left 
were unable (or unwilling) to form a viable and functioning coalition in 1919, which 
could have been the foundation for a stable, democratic Germany. It also sheds light on 
the evolution of the German masses from a politically passive group into an active and 
vibrant political body, to which the most successful and dynamic political parties of the 
Weimar period, the radical right, represented by certain members of the Fatherland Party, 
and the far left, appealed for support. The leaders of these new political parties, who 
reached their maturity in the First World War, had their political experience formed by 
observing intense intra-party conflicts, of which the largest and most public was the 
conflict between Fatherland Party and the SPD. This unique experience of mass 
mobilization surely led to the radicalization of politics in 1920's and helped speed along 
all the tragedies that produced Germany' s ultimate defeat in 1945 . 
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